Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics
Competition and Innovation
W Nicholson PriceIP & Arti K. Rai-*
ABSTRACT: As finding breakthrough small-molecule drugs becomes more
difficult, drug companies are increasingly turning to "large molecule"
biologics. Although biologics represent many of the most promising new
therapies for previously intractable diseases, they are extremely expensive.
Moreover, the pathway for generic-type competition set up by Congress in
20 1o

is unlikely to yield significantcost savings.

This Article provides a fresh diagnosis of and prescription for this major
public policy problem. It argues that the key cause is pervasive trade secrecy in
the complex area of biologics manufacturing. Under the current regime, this
trade secrecy, combined with certain features of Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA ") regulation, not only creates high barriersto entry of
indefinite duration but also undermines efforts to advance fundamental
knowledge about how biologicsfunction and are best produced.
In sharp contrast, offering incentivesfor information disclosure to originator
manufacturerswould leverage the existing interactionof tradesecrecy and the
regulatory state in a positive direction. Trade secrecy, particularly in complex
areas like biologics manufacturing, often. involves tacit knowledge that is
difficult to codify and thus transfer. In this case, however, regulatory
requirements mandate that originatormanufacturerssubmit manufacturing
details. As a consequence, manufacturers have already codified the relevant
tacit knowledge. Carefully structured mechanismsfor incentivizing disclosure
of these regulatory submissions would not only spur competition, but would
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also provide a rich source of information upon which additional research,
includingfundamental research into the science of manufacturing, could
build.
In addition to providing a fresh diagnosis and prescription in the specific
area of biologics, this Article contributes to more generalscholarship on trade
secrecy and tacit knowledge. Prior scholarship has neglected the extent to
which regulation can turn tacit knowledge not only into codified knowledge
but into precisely the type of codified knowledge that is most likely to be useful
and accurate. This Article also draws a link to the literature on adaptive
regulation, arguing that greater regulatoryflexibility is necessary and that
morefundamental knowledge should spurflexibility.
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INTRODUCTION

Most drugs are small. Aspirin, for instance, is made up ofjust 21 atoms.
Small drugs like aspirin provide the majority of global revenue for brandname drug companies. But finding new small-molecule drugs keeps getting
harder, and generic drug manufacturers are quick to compete with brandname firms once patents expire. As a result, drug companies are increasingly
turning to very large drugs: biologics produced by living cells.2 In terms of size

and rough complexity, if an aspirin were a bicycle, a small biologic would be
a Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an F-16 fighter jet.3 Biologics
provide promising new avenues for doctors to better treat patients, and-not
coincidentally-for drug companies to profit. But making biologics is more
complex than making small-molecule drugs, and that complexity raises
serious challenges for innovation and competition policy in the
biopharmaceutical industry.
Biologics represent attractive investment opportunities for drug
companies. Spending on small-molecule drugs is close to stagnant, especially
in developed countries. In contrast, annual global spending on biologics was
$93 billion in 2oo6, rose 69% to $157 billion in 201 1, and is expected to rise
another 30%, to between $2oo billion and $2 1o billion in 2016.4

In the United States, percentage expenditures on biologics will be even
more substantial. Indeed, some health care industry analysts predict that in
the United States so-called specialty drugs-a category that overlaps
substantially with biologics-will represent half of annual prescription drug
spending by 2020.5
To some extent, the money reflects changes in medicine: Biologics
represent many of the most prominent, and promising, new treatments for
cancer and other major diseases. They include Avastin, an anti-cancer
therapeutic protein with $6.1 billion in global 2012 sales; and the three bestselling therapies of 2012, Humira ($9.3 billion), Remicade ($9.1 billion), and
6
Enbrel ($8.1 billion), each used to treat rheumatoid arthritis.
1. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property
StrategiesforAccelerated DrugDiscovery, 8 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. &ETHICS I ( 2 OO8).
2.

See infra notes 29-34.

3.

Deepak Gupta et al., A CMO Perspective on Quality Challenges for Biopharmaceuticals,

BIOPROCESS INT'L (Oct. 1, 2013, 9:OO AM), http://www.bioprocessind.com/manufacturing/

antibody-non-antibody/a-cmo-perspectve-on-quality-challenges-for-biopharmaceuticals-3
4.

4 733 5.
IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE GLOBAL USE OF MEDICINES: OUTLOOK

THROUGH 2016, at 9 (2012), https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%2olnstitute/Reports/
The% 2oGlobal%2oUse% 200f%
/ oMedicines% 2oOutlook% 2oThrough%2020 6/MedicinesOu

tookThrough2o16_Report.pdf. In 2016, the global market for small-molecule drugs and
biologics will be $1.2 trillion. Id. at 5. The global percentage share for biologics in 2016 will be
about 16%. Id. at4.
5.

SUZANNE

M.

KIRCHHOFF,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

R4 4 13 2 SPECIALTY DRUGS:

BACKGROUND AND POLICY CONCERNS 2 (2015).

6.

Biologic Drugs Set to Top 2o2

Sales, 18NATUREMED. 636,636

(2012).
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But total sales revenues also reflect high prices. Although biologics are
prescribed less frequently than the most popular small-molecule drugs, they
have an average daily cost in the United States that is 22 times higher than
small-molecule drug therapies.7
Differences in intellectual property protection drive much of the price
differential between small molecules and biologics. In general, under the
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, the originator firms' small molecules are
protected by patents and by a short (five-year) period of exclusivity over the
clinical trial data the originator must generate to secure approval by the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"). After that short exclusivity period, HatchWaxman treats the originator clinical trial data as informational infrastructure
whose social value is maximized through some level of competitor access.'
Specifically, competitors can bypass conducting their own duplicative clinical
trials on the same molecule and secure FDA approval based on the originator
firm's data. The five-year regulatory exclusivity, which begins once originator
marketing has begun, typically expires well before originator patents expire.
Thus, once small-molecule patents expire, the usual result is pricing at or near
marginal cost. Generics now represent more than 8o% of all small-molecule
prescriptions in the United States.
In contrast, until 2Oio-more than three decades into the biotechnology
revolution and well after many relevant patents had begun to expire-the
United States had no mechanism by which competitors could rely on
originator data for biologics. And only as of July 2014, four years after the
establishment of a "follow-on" pathway in the 201o Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act ("BPCIA"),9 did the FDA finally accept its
first application for a "follow-on" biologic.lo In contrast, the European
7.
Elizabeth Richardson, Biosimilars: To Encourage Competition, the Health Care Law Directsthe
FDA to Develop an Accelerated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Versions of Original Biologic Products,
HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH POL'YBRIEF (Oct. 1O, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/

brieLpdfs/healthpolicybrief_ oo.pdf.
8.

See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED

RESOURCES (2012) (discussing a broad range of contexts where a resource's social value can be
maximized through some level of shared access).
9. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148,

§§

7001-03, 124 Star. 119, 804-21 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)).

The BPCIA was passed as part of the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA").
lo. In January 2015, an FDA scientific advisory board undertook the next step and
recommended that the FDA approve the biosimilar application for filgrastim. Sandoz Biosimilar
FilgrastimRecommended for Approval by FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee, SANDOZ, http://

www.sandoz.com/media-center/press releasesnews/global_news/20 14-0 1 _07_Sandozbiosi
milarfilgrastim-recommended-forapproval-byFDAOncologicDrugsAdvisoryCommittee.
shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). The FDA officially approved the application on March 6, 2015.
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Biosimilar Product Zarxio (Mar. 6,
2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm 4 3 66 4 8.htm. The
brand-name, or reference, product for filgrastim is Amgen's Neupogen. Id. Perhaps not
surprisingly, on the spectrum of biologics complexity, filgrastim is relatively simple, weighing in
at 1 8,88o Daltons. See Anurag S. Rathore & Rahul Bhambure, EstablishingAnalytical Comparability
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Medicines Agency ("EMA") started approving follow-on biologics in 2oo6 and
has now approved 21 follow-on, or biosimilar, products."
Commentators have discussed the very substantial lag in U.S.
development of a follow-on pathway.12 They have also discussed distortions in
research and development portfolios that might be caused by the
congressional decision to confer upon originator biologics firms a 12-year
period of data exclusivity while retaining the five-year period for small
molecules.1s Much less discussed, but perhaps more profound in the long
term, is the significant barrier to biologic-market entry that may persist
indefinitely as a consequence of the trade secrecy pervasive in the field of
biologics manufacturing.
This trade secrecy is critical because, unlike small molecules, many
complex biologic products cannot be fully characterized by current
techniques for analyzing the end product.'4 Moreover, slight variations in the
manufacturing process can change the quality, safety, or efficacy of the final
product. Thus while generic entrants in the area of small molecules can
readily characterize the brand-name product and then reverse engineer one
or more chemical synthetic paths to the product, biosimilar competitors face
a much more strenuous and expensive task.
European biosimilar product manufacturers have on average expended
between $1oo million and $250 million and seven to eight years in the reverse
engineering necessary to bring these products to market.'5 This cost is likely
to rise as biologics that are particularly difficult to manufacture, such as
monoclonal antibodies, begin to dominate the market.' 6 In comparison, the
cost of bringing a generic small-molecule to market may be as low as $i
million to $2 million.'7
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, European countries have seen only
modest price reductions for biosimilars. The average price discount is about
25%, and by 2020 the total cost savings from biosimilar introduction in

for "Biosimilars":Filgrastim As a Case Study, 4o6 ANALYTICAL & BIOANALYnICAL CHEMISTRY 6569,
6574 fig.4 (2014).
ii.
See Biosimilars Approved in Europe, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE ONLINE (Feb. 27,
2015), http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/General/Biosimilars-approved-in-Europe.

12.

See, e.g., Benjamin P. Falit et al., Biosimilar Competition in the United States: Statutory

Incentives, Payers, and PharmacyBenefit Managers,34 HEALTH AFF. 294, 295 (2015).

13.

See Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and Policy

Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 547-55 (2011). In contrast, the European Union has the same

period of regulatory exclusivity for both small molecules and drugs. See id.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. Gary Walsh, BiopharmaceuticalBenchmarks 2014, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 992, 995
(2014).
16.

See generally id.

17.
OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 4-5 (201o), http://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-

report/expanding-use-generic-drugs.
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Europe will likely range from $15 billion to $44 billion' 8 Analysts have
projected similarly modest, or even lower, cost savings in the United States
over the next decade.'9 In contrast, although the generic entry regime for
small molecules set up by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 does allow some
gaming of the regulatory system (and much scholarly ink has been spilled on
such gaming) ,20 reputable estimates suggest that generic entry under HatchWaxman has saved U.S. consumers as much as $i trillion between 1999 and
2010.21

Addressing the trade secret challenge is far from obvious. Indeed, most
commentators who have noted the issue appear to have accepted the
biosimilar path's limitations, perhaps with the hope that the cost of reverse
engineering by follow-on manufacturers will eventually diminish as analytic
techniques slowly improve, relationships between process and product slowly
become better understood, and at least some of this knowledge becomes
accessible to biosimilar manufacturers.22 Given the very substantial cost
challenge posed by biologics, a more proactive approach seems appropriate.
The proactive approach that some countries use-government-imposed
price regulation of originator products-misses the mark. Putting aside

18.
Francis Megerlin et al., Biosimilars and the European Experience: Implicationsfor the United
States, 32 HEALTHAFF. 18o3, 18o5-o6 (2013).
Henry G. Grabowski et al., Regulatory and Cost Barriers Are Likely to Limit Biosimila7
19.
Development and Expected Savings in the Near Future,33 HEALTH AFF. 1048, 1056 (2014) (arguing
that "the relatively moderate estimate by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) of a cumulative
$25 billion in total cost savings from the use of biosimilars over the first decade after the
[BPCIA's] passage ... looks overly optimistic").
2o. According to critics of the practice, branded firms game the system by seeking secondary
patents of dubious validity and then paying generic entrants not to challenge the patents. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Crane, Per Se Illegalityfor Reverse Payment Patent Settlements?, 61 ALA. L. REV. 575, 577
(2o 1o); Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281,
283 (2011); C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, EarningExclusivity: GenericDrug Incentives and
the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948 (201 1). The Supreme Court's 2013 decision
in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013), applies antitrust law to
place constraints on these so-called reverse payments. But even the Federal Trade Commission,
a major executive branch critic of reverse payments, estimates that an outright ban on such
payments would save consumers a relatively modest $35 billion over the next decade. SeeJon
Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help
Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) (June 23, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industryhow-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-protect/o9o62 3payfordelayspeech.pdf.
GENERIC PHARM. ASS'N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 3 ( 4 th annual ed. 2012), http://
21.
www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-content/uploads/20 12/o8/2012-GPHA-IMS-GENERIC-SAVINGSSTUDY.pdf. Although some have criticized these IMS studies for failing to account for
confidential discounts brand-name manufacturers have given purchasers, recent IMS Health
estimates of these discounts suggest that they only would reduce the $s trillion figure by about
20%. See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supranote 4, at 3.
22.

See, e.g., Grabowski et al., supra note 19.

1030

IOWA LA WREVIEW

[VOL 101:1023

political feasibility,s such price regulation mistakenly views the problem as
one of natural monopoly.24 The problem is instead one of information
sharing, and price regulation does nothing to foster the disclosure necessary
to foster information-based innovation.
Because the problem is one of information sharing, price regulation also
fails to address the suboptimal incentive for originator manufacturers to
disseminate, and likely even to generate, fundamental knowledge about
biologics manufacturing processes. As we will discuss, this suboptimal
incentive emerges not only from well-understood economic principles
governing basic research, but also from the nature of post-approval federal
regulatory oversight over manufacturing process details.
This Article undertakes what is to our knowledge the first comprehensive
scholarly inquiry into the problem of secret biologics manufacturing
processes.2 5 This Article argues that policy interventions encouraging greater
information disclosure and generation, both by individual originator firms
and through public-private consortia, would yield both cost efficiencies and
6
innovation gains.2
With respect to individual firms, one option might involve greater
disclosure of manufacturing processes in the product/composition-of-matter
patent applications brand-name manufacturers file. Although existing patent
law requires substantially more disclosure than biopharmaceutical applicants
provide, simply requiring more disclosure would likely lead originator firms
to abandon the patent path altogether. In this context, trade secrecy appears

23. Notably, the politically controversial ACA, which expands insurance coverage and
regulates most insurance plans, does not attempt any type of price regulation of biologics.
Instead, it "caps patients' total out-of-pocket spending [insurance companies can impose] at
approximately $6,500 for individuals and $13,ooo for families." See Falit et al., supra note 12, at
299. These caps may actually create another shelter from competition for originator biologics
firms. Some have argued that even if biosimilars do come on the market at somewhat reduced
prices, these caps make insured patients less price-sensitive and thus less likely voluntarily to
choose biosimilars. Id.
24. See generally William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a
Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 809 (1977) (attempting to correct ambiguity in the term
"natural monopoly").
25. To the extent commentators have engaged the issue, they have generally argued that
patents covering biologics may be invalid because they do not disclose how to make the biologic.
See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-ReproduceInventions: ProcessElements and Biotechnology's
Compliance with the Enablement Requirement,3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 o9 (2 0 11 ); Gregory N.
Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry's Unintended Admission That Biotech Patents Fail

Enablement, 55 VA.J.L. & TECH., Fall 2oo6, at i. However, as we note below and discuss at length
in Part IV, mandating more disclosure in patents is unlikely to generate disclosure of the trade
secrets that are most relevant.
26. We focus here on trade secrecy in the federal regulatory state and thus do not address
whether changes to state law that would discourage covenants not to compete and other
restrictions on employee mobility might promote socially beneficial diffusion of relevant
information across firms. See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS To BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD
LEARN TO LovE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013).
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more privately valuable than patents. And invalidation ofpatents already
granted on grounds of inadequate disclosure is not going to spur greater
disclosure.
Our preferred approach capitalizes on the existing interaction of trade
secrecy with the regulatory state. As this Article will discuss, the interaction
currently reinforces barriers to biologic market entry, but it could be
leveraged in a more positive direction.
Specifically, although trade secrecy often involves tacit knowledge that is
difficult to transfer, the FDA regulatory requirements mandating that
originator manufacturers submit manufacturing details has already turned
tacit knowledge into codified information. This codified information is
already subject to the usual economics associated with codification: low
marginal cost of transfer and replication.27 Moreover, originators' interest in
getting their biologic approved ensures that this codified knowledge is
presented in a manner that is useful and accurate.
Additionally, because FDA approval represents the time by which
relevant manufacturing process information must be fully developed and
codified, disclosure tied to FDA approval is superior to disclosure within the
patent system. Indeed, tying information disclosure to FDA approval has some
existing precedent. As discussed in Part IV, the BPCIA already requires some
level of manufacturing process disclosure on the part of the biosimilar
manufacturer.
Although disclosure could in theory be elicited either through incentives
or mandates, incentives are likely superior. Even putting aside political
feasibility, mandates may unduly undermine incentives, and in any event the
takings doctrine likely limits the ability to use mandates that have retroactive
impact.
Disclosure linked to FDA regulatory levers would be valuable not only for
competition but also for innovation. In particular, it would provide a rich
source of information upon which fundamental research into the science of
manufacturing could build. But independent of whether such disclosure
comes to pass, more fundamental research is essential. Nascent initiatives by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") to use publicprivate consortia to generate such fundamental knowledge and place it in the
public domain are likely to yield substantial benefits for both competition and
innovation.
As noted, we believe this Article's analysis represents the first
comprehensive examination of the major public policy challenge posed by
trade secrecy in biologics manufacturing. Of course, the question of trade
secrecy in processes, or in the regulatory State, is not new. This Article draws

27.

See, e.g., 1 DAVIDJ. TEECE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: THE

SELECTED PAPERS OF DAVIDJ. TEECE 398-99 (1998) (comparing low costs of technology transfer
involving codified knowledge with high costs involving tacit knowledge).
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upon, and contributes to, a number of active scholarly debates on such trade
secrecy. In terms of contribution, prior literature on trade secrecy in the
regulatory State has not emphasized the extent to which regulation can turn
tacit industry knowledge not only into codified knowledge but into precisely
the codified knowledge that is most likely to be useful and accurate. This
Article also draws a heretofore underexplored link to the literature on
adaptive regulation, arguing that greater regulatory flexibility on the part of
the FDA is necessary and that more fundamental knowledge about biologics
manufacturing processes should spur flexibility.
Part II of this Article presents the basic scientific and regulatory
framework. Part III highlights the large efficiency distortions created by the
framework.28 Part IV presents policy prescriptions. Part V discusses the link to
the literature on adaptive regulation.

II. BIOLOGIC MANUFACTURING AND BIOSIMILARS
Biologics are complex macromolecular therapeutics produced by living
sources rather than through chemical synthesis29 Biologics as a class include
therapeutic proteins, toxins and antitoxins, viruses, blood and blood
products, gene therapy products, and whole cells, among others.3o As a
general matter, they are much more complex than traditional small-molecule
drugs.3, Therapeutic protein biologics-the class of biologics on which we

28. Of course, in the health context, many would argue that values other than efficiency are
quite important. For present purposes, this Article need not squarely engage this important
debate, as the efficiency-related objectives of reducing deadweight loss and duplicative research
point in the same direction as distributive justice and prevention of harm to human subjects
through duplicative clinical trials.
29.
Jordan Paradise, Foreword, Follow-on Biologics: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities,
41 SETON HALL L.REV. 501, 502-03 (2011).
3o. Section § 262 (i) of the BPCIA defines biologics as
a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized
polypeptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of
arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.
U.S.C. § 262 (i) (2012). FDA guidance under the BPCIA specifies that any intervention greater
than 40 amino acids is considered a biologic "protein" unless it is made entirely through chemical
synthesis and is under loo amino acids. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARiTy TO A REFERENCE
PRODUcT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 24 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM29i 128.pdf.
31. However, because a few biologics are relatively simple, the BPCIA definition provided
some clarity. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i). Prior to the BPCIA, some biologics (e.g., human growth
hormone) were reviewed by the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER")
rather than its Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research ("CBER"). Bob Carlson, FDA: Change
Is Good, BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE, Mar. 2004, at 27, 27. An interesting question for further
research is whether the current binary division between CDER and CBER (and for that matter
42
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determined by four different hierarchical organization levels3S and can be

modified in various ways through their synthesis by the living source.34 As a
consequence, the specific contours of manufacturing processes, including the
selection of the host organism, the identification of a particular cell line,
culture and media conditions, and purification procedures, all impact the
characteristics and activity of the final product.35 This Part first addresses the
complex process of manufacturing biologics and its impact on the final
biologic. Next, it considers the inadequacy of current techniques for
characterizing the end product, and how that inadequacy interacts with pathdependent manufacturing. Third, it looks to the inadequate incentives for
developing fundamental knowledge. Finally, it discusses the current
regulatory framework for biosimilars.
A.

MANUtFACTURING BIoLOGICS

This Subpart considers the process of manufacturing biologics, as both
the technical complexity and the path-dependence of this process are
important for the competition and innovation issues with which we are
concerned. Since certain technical details may be of interest to only a limited
subset of readers, we have left many such details to the footnotes.
i.

Path Dependence

Understanding the complexity of biologic manufacturing requires a
brief, contrasting explanation of how small-molecule drugs are made. Smallmolecule drugs are relatively simple chemical structures, generally made up
6
of no more than several dozen atoms. Once identified, the compound

between Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA) will adequately address the spectrum of complexity
going forward. That question is beyond the scope of this Article.
32. John Gar Yan Chan et al., An Overview of Biosimilars, 14 7 J. & PROC. ROYAL SOc'Y NEW
SOUTH WALES 77, 77-78 (2014).

33. Proteins are characterized in increasing level of complexity by their primary amino acid
sequence, secondary structure (i.e., the arrangement of amino acids into low-level structures,
such as alpha helices and beta strands), tertiary structure (i.e., the arrangement of low-level
structure into larger structures, such as beta barrels or zinc fingers, which can play specific
functional roles), and quaternary structure (i.e., the interaction between different proteins or
copies of the same protein to form a larger structure). CARL BRANDEN & JOHN TOOZE,
INTRODUCTION TO PROTEIN STRUCTURE 3 (2d ed. 1999).

34" Paul J. Declerck, Biologicals and Biosimilars: A Review of the Science and Its Implications, 1
GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVEJ. 13, 13 (2012).
35.

Id.

36. Lipinski's Rule is used as a rough estimation of whether a molecule is suitable for use as
an oral drug, assuming that the compound is biologically active. The Rule states that no more
than one of five characteristics may be violated, and one characteristic is that the molecule be less
than 5oo Daltons in size. Christopher A. Lipinski et al., Experimentaland CoamputationalApproaches
to Estimate Solubility and Permeability in DrugDiscovery and Development Settings, 23 ADVANCED DRUG
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frequently can be made through any of several different chemical synthesis
pathways.37 Although the choice of chemical synthesis pathway may have an
impact on manufacturing cost, it generally has little to no impact on the
identity of the final product.38 Small-molecule synthesis is well understood
and the final products are usually quite pure with any impurities well
characterized. No matter the pathway, the company knows what it has made
and can confirm that the final product is essentially identical to the product
of another company's different pathway.39 This identity allows the
introduction of generic small-molecule drugs via the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984.4°

Biologics, as opposed to small-molecule drugs, are typically far more
path-dependent entities. Consider, for example, one of the first steps in
process development for a biologic: selecting a cell line which will eventually
produce the biologic. The details of cell line selection reveal both significant
complexities and the presence of random, uncontrolled events.41
Cell line selection is an essentially random process. A starter population
of cells is selected from among several possibilities (bacterial, yeast, or cells
from mice or hamsters) and DNA encoding the protein of interest is added
to the cells. This DNA is taken up in essentially random amounts.42 To
leverage this random distribution of both the number and location of gene
copies, the cells are isolated, grown into populations, and evaluated for
growth and production rates.43 Further selection, with its own random
elements, can help increase the number of copies, stability, and growth rate
of the eventual final cell line.44

DELIVERY REVIEWS 3, 8-9 (1997). Biologics, on the other hand, are frequently more than 50,000

Daltons.

37.

See generay 7 DANIEL LEDNICER, THE ORGANIC

38.

Id.
See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ETAL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE

39.

CHEMISTRY OF DRUG SYNTHESIS (2008).

FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES SUBMITTED IN NDAS OR INDS-

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecompliance

regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm389370.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Aleg Berlec & Borut Strukelj, Current State and Recent Advances in Biopharmaceutical
Production in Escherichia coli, Yeasts and Mammalian Cells, 40 J. INDUS. MICROBIOLOGY &
BIOTECHNOLOGY 257,

42.

269 (2013).

In this process, known as transfection for mammalian cells and transformation for

bacteria and non-animal eukaryotic cells, the recombinant DNA typically includes a gene
encoding the therapeutic protein, a selection marker, and regulatory sequences. Feng Li et al.,
Current Therapeutic Antibody Productionand Process Optimization, BIOPROCESSINGJ., Winter 2oo6, at
16, 16-17. Note that this process, too, relies on random mutation and copying: Cells only get
more copies after the initial transfection from mutations that multiply the number of copies of
the desired genes. But this mutation, too, is a random process.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Once promising cells have been identified, the number of copies can be increased by
raising the concentration of selection marker inhibitor in the culture medium: Only cells with

2o16]

MANUFACTURING BARRIERS

1035

Subsequent stages in manufacturing are also quite complex, as they turn
on the interaction of the cell line with a complex environment. Once the
culture medium is optimized (itself a process of some complexity) ,45 cells are
grown in large-scale vessels, making the biologic in a complex and variable
production environment.4 Once production is complete, the protein must
be isolated and purified in several steps.47
2.

Physiological Effects

This Article emphasizes these manufacturing details because final
therapeutic proteins are influenced by each step in the manufacturing
process. To take one well-studied example, the choice of organism from which
to generate a cell line, and the culture conditions, can alter the pattern of
carbohydrates attached to the surface of the protein, also known as the
"glycosylation pattern."48 Changes in glycosylation can significantly impact the
biologic in several ways, including the stability of the protein (both outside
and inside the body),49 the length of time the protein remains with the
bloodstream,5o the binding of the protein to its therapeutic targets,5, and the
reaction of the body's immune system to the protein.52
For example, one study observed severe hypersensitivity in patients
treated with Cetuximab, a monoclonal antibody used to treat metastatic
colorectal cancer and squamous-cell carcinoma of the head and neck.5s This

hypersensitivity was based on the presence of a specific type of glycan attached
to the protein, produced in mice but not in humans. The company had
elected to make Cetuximab in a mouse cell line, and that early choice created

multiple copies of the resistance marker, and thus the biologic gene, can survive the increased
inhibitor. Id.
45. Id. Note that in addition to the complexity of determining the best culture medium, the
proteins used to feed the cells, usually digests from soy, wheat, or yeast, themselves, have a
complex composition and may vary significantly from lot to lot. Id.
46. Throughout the growth process the cells are fed and maintained in an environment of
monitored and dynamically changed temperature, pH, and other characteristics such as dissolved
oxygen and carbon dioxide. Id. at 17-19.
47. Id. at 2o-23. Purification can vary significantly depending on whether the cell produces
the protein and excretes it into the culture medium or keeps the protein within itself; the latter
possibility requires an additional step of breaking the cells apart. Id.
48.

Huijuan Li & Marc d'Anjou, PharmacologicalSignificance of Glycosylation in Therapeutic

Proteins, 20 CURRENT OPINION BIOTECHNOLOGY 678, 678-82 (2009). Maintaining consistent
glycosylation is challenging as glycosylation patterns can change based on production system,
production batch, and even over the course of a single production batch. Michael Butler, Animal
Cell Cultures: Recent Achievements and Perspectives in the Productionof Biopharmaceuticals,68 APPLIED
MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECHNOLOGY 283, 286-88 (2oo5).

49.
5o.
51.
52.
53.

Li & d'Anjou, supra note 48, at 679.
Id. at 68o-8 1.
Id. at 679-8o.
Id. at681-82.
Id.
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a serious clinical issue once the biologic was actually used in patients.54
Glycosylation is merely one type of variation known as post-translational
modification, which are changes that happen after the protein's basic
structure is formed. Manufacturing variation can lead to a plethora of such
modifications and other alterations, with substantial clinical implications.
Notable clinical effects include serious immunogenic reactions.5
B.

INADEQUACY OFANALYTICAL SCIENCE

The complexity and path-dependence of biologics manufacturing would
be less important if analytical methods could characterize end-product
biologics in sufficient detail to allow a determination of identity. However, in
many cases, the state of analytical science at present and in the foreseeable
6
future falls short of that goal.5
As discussed, biologics are highly variable, and such variability can have
major impacts on a drug's safety and efficacy. Analytical methods could ease
this problem by verifying that two different products were essentially identical
in all relevant characteristics. In other words, even if manufacturing methods
were different, the difference in manufacturing methods would matter less if
the final products could be demonstrated to be identical. This approach
works for small-molecule drugs. Indeed, the ease of proving product identity,
independent of its manufacturing process, is what makes generic drugs under
Hatch-Waxman possible.
However, although the issue is somewhat disputed, in many cases
analytical methods available to biosimilar firms are insufficient to verify
identity.57 Although the analytical methods available are substantial, they
cannot ensure that two proteins are identical.58 Therefore, in order for a
follow-on manufacturer to be confident that it has duplicated an originator
firm's biologic, it must have knowledge of the originator firm's manufacturing
process and cell lines.59
As noted, the extent to which biosimilar manufacturers can rely on
analytical science is somewhat disputed. In a series of important articles, Mark
McCamish, Head of Global Biopharmaceutical Development at Sandoz, and
Gillian Woollett of Avalere Health have argued that analytical techniques have
progressed to the point that biosimilar manufacturers should be able to prove
similarity in the same way that originator manufacturers prove
"comparability" in analyzing the consequences of their own process changes

54.

Id.

55. See Steven A. Berkowitz et al., Analytical Toolsfor CharacterizingBiopharmaceuticalsand the
Implicationsfor Biosimilars, 1 i NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DIsCOVERY 527, 531-33 (2012).
56. Id.; see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., supra note 3o, at 4.
57. See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 55; Huub Schellekens, Commentary, How Similar Do
'Biosimilars'Needto Bet, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1357 (2004).
58. Berkowitz et al., supra note 55, at 52 7.
59. Schellekens, supra note 57, at 1358.
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post-approval. 6o On this view, the FDA makes post-approval comparability
determinations "extensively," and rarely requires intensive work (e.g., clinical
trials) in these determinations. 6' Sandoz's views are particularly worthy of
note, as it is the first firm to secure approval of a biosimilar application with
the FDA (albeit on a relatively simple biologic, filgrastim (Neupogen)).62
Notably, however, Sandoz's application, as well as the FDA approval,
ultimately relied heavily on clinical trials and the extensive European patient
experience with the Sandoz product.63 Similarly, as a recent FDA guidance
document emphasizes, originator manufacturers can demonstrate to the FDA
detailed knowledge of their manufacturing process-knowledge they have
built up over many years. 64 In contrast, according to the FDA, "the
manufacturer of a proposed [biosimilar] product is likely to have a different
manufacturing process (e.g., different cell line, raw materials, equipment,
processes, process controls, and acceptance criteria) ... and no direct
knowledge of the [originator's] manufacturing process." 65 Therefore, the
FDA believes "that more data and information will be needed to establish
66
biosimilarity than would be needed to establish" comparability.
C.

MISSING INCENTIVES FOR UADERSTANDING

This Article's discussion of the existing science relies on publicly available
information. In some cases, originator firms (and, for that matter, biosimilar
firms) may have developed more precise analytical methods, as well as more
precise understandings about the effects of different manufacturing method
changes. Originator firms have at least some economic incentive to develop
6o.

Mark McCamish & Gillian Woolletn, Worldwide Experience with BiosimilarDevelopment,

s

MABS, 209, 210-11 (2011) [hereinafter McCamish & Woollett, Worldwide Experience]; see also Mark

McCamish & Gillian Woollett, The State of the Art in the Development of Biosimilars, 91 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 405,408 (2012) [hereinafter McCamish & Woollett, The State

of the Art] (noting that the frequency with which these determinations are made is not clear
because FDA comparability determinations are not public).
61. McCamish &Woollett, Worldwide Experience, supra note 6o, at 2 10.
62. In 2010, Sandoz had secured approval via the Hatch-Waxman pathway for a generic
version of the complex non-biologic product Lovenox. Id. at'214. Similarly, Momenta
Pharmaceuticals argues that its
generic versions of the complex products Lovenox and Copaxone
are essentially identical and that duplicating those products reflects greater challenges than
duplicating a biologic. Complex Generics, MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS, http://www.momenta
pharma.com/pipeline/complex-generics.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2o6). However, Momenta
has not yet submitted any biosimilar applications in the United States, much less been approved.
Baxalta and Momenta Start Phase III Trial for Adalimumab Biosimilar, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS
INITIATIVE ONLINE (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/Baxalta-andMomenta-start-phase-Ill-trial-for-adalimumab-biosimilar.
63. Ajaz S. Hussain, Biosimilarsin the USA: Is the EUBiosimilarExperience Advantage Goodforthe
USA?, LINKEDIN PULSE (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/biosimilars-usa-eubiosimilar-experience-advantage-hussain-ph-d-.
64. FOOD &DRUG ADMIN. ETAL., supra note 30, at 5-6.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id.

1038
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an understanding of manufacturing methods that reduces marginal
manufacturing cost and reduces potential tort liability by improving quality.
Biosimilar firms following the model advocated by Mark McCamish of Sandoz
may have incentives to develop fundamental knowledge regarding analytical
techniques. 67
However, the available evidence indicates that the private sector's
understanding of scientific fundamentals is underdeveloped. As noted above,
FDA guidance documents state that the agency makes comparability
determinations for originator manufacturers based in significant part on
detailed knowledge of manufacturing process. Similarly, the FDA has testified
before Congress about originators being unable "to fully measure structural
68
differences that could be caused by changes in the manufacturing process."
Additionally, as discussed further in Part IV.B, biologic originator
manufacturers have themselves noted to Congress their concerns about being
unable to predict, or even measure accurately, the creation of particles in
their products that may provoke immune reactions. About a decade ago, this
issue was brought to the fore by a prominent case involving the originator
firm Johnson &Johnson and certain batches of its product Eprex, which was
intended to address anemia by inducing creation of red blood cells but
6
instead ended up inducing red blood cell death. 9
Moreover, widely accepted economic models of basic research pioneered
by Richard Nelson and Kenneth Arrow suggest that even firms that conduct
substantial research and development might underinvest in fundamental
understanding.7o Although Nelson, Arrow, and others focus on basic research
that is far removed from commercial application, their arguments also apply
to fundamental understanding of work that has obvious commercial
application-what Donald Stokes has famously called "use-inspired basic
science."71 In both cases, although fundamental understanding could have
some advantages for the firm's internal operations (in this case by reducing
manufacturing cost or improving quality), the full social value of such

67. See McCamish & Woollett, The State of the Art, supra note 6o, at 41 1-12.
68.
The Potential Need for Measurement Standards to Facilitate the Research and Development of
Biologic Drugs: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Tech. & Innovation of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech.,
is ith Cong. 68-70 (2009) (statement of Steven Kozlowski, Director, Office of Biotechnology
Prods., Office of Pharm. Sci., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Food & Drug Admin.).
69. Sabine Louft, Lessons from Eprex for BiogenericFirms, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 956,
956 (2003).
7o . Kenneth J. Arrow, The Rand Corp., Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 612 (Universities-National Bureau ed., 1962). See generally Richard R. Nelson, The Simple
Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959).
71.
See generally DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR'S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997).
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understanding is likely to be captured only through broad use that has
associated spillovers.72
Thus, an individual firm's return of investment in this fundamental
research may be negative. For this reason, as discussed further in Part IV.B,
the economic literature often looks favorably on research and development
collaborations even between firms that are horizontal competitors.
This standard underinvestment story is bolstered by the regulatory
context, which likely exacerbates underinvestment in fundamental
understanding of how biologics work and are produced. With respect to small
molecules, where significant fundamental understanding does exist, the FDA
has been reluctant to allow manufacturers to implement this fundamental
understanding to make changes once they have received market approval.7s
From the FDA's standpoint, once an originator firm has secured approval, the
identity of the molecule is largely set, and any substantial change will typically
demand further clinical trials.74 In fact, detailed knowledge of manufacturing

parameters sometimes leads to greater regulatory commitments: If a process
can be controlled tightly, the FDA may then rigidly require such tight control,
imposing additional burdens on the manufacturer.75 To the extent that
originators assume, based on the experience with small molecules, that
fundamental understanding in the area of biologics will not ease their path in
terms of making changes post-approval, they will underinvest in such
understanding.
As for biosimilar firms, firms like Sandoz may be generating at least some
fundamental knowledge about analytical characterization techniques. Public
presentations by Sandoz on its biosimilar application for filgrastim have
stressed the extensive array of analytical techniques the firm has used to

72.
But see Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity:A New Perspective on
Learningand Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 128 (1990) (arguing that firms may invest in research
that has significant spillovers in order to attain "absorptive capacity"). In the legal literature,
Edmund Kitch has gone in the opposite direction from Cohen. He has prominently analogized
basic research to tangible property, and thereby argued that if a firm could be allowed an
extremely broad patent on the basic research, it could capture full social surplus by exploiting
certain uses of that patent internally and then licensing other uses. See generally Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the PatentSystem, 2oJ.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). While economists per se
have generally not engaged Kitch's claim, an extensive law and economics literature disputes the
claim. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of PatentScope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990).
73. For a description of the effect of regulatory lock-in of idiosyncratic production choices
on later manufacturing innovation in the small-molecule context, see W. Nicholson Price II,
Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and PharmaceuticalManufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REv.
491, 519-22 (2014).

74- Id.
75. See Norman Winskill, Vice President, Mfg., Pfizer, Inc., Testimony to the Food and Drug
Administration Science Board Meeting (Nov. 16,200 1), http://www.fda.gov/ohrns/dockets/ac/o /
transcripts/3799t 02.pdf.
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demonstrate similarity.76 As noted, however, filgrastim is a relatively simple
biologic.77 Moreover, Sandoz's application, and even more so the FDA
advisory committee that recently approved the application, relied heavily on
clinical trials and on the extensive European patient experience with the
Sandoz product.78
D.

THE CuRREN STATUTORYAND REGULA TORYFRAMEWORK

The BPCIA reflects the inability of follow-on firms to produce true
generic biologics. In the statute, Congress tried to ensure that follow-on
biologics would be similar enough to achieve some of the efficiency and
competitive advantages of generics.79 The FDA, implementing the statute, has
outlined the regulatory approach it will take to demonstrate biosimilarityso
The FDA's approach underscores the challenges faced by biosimilar
manufacturers.
1. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
Congress passed the BPCIA in 20o as Title VII of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). 8' In relevant part, it amended the Public
Health Service Act to create a biosimilar pathway modeled to some extent
after the Hatch-Waxman Act's generic drug approval pathway. 82 However, for
the reasons discussed above, requiring that follow-on biologics meet the same
standards as generics was judged infeasible. Instead, follow-on biologics may
rely on the safety and efficacy data of the reference biologic if they are "highly
similar" to the reference. 83
To be "highly similar" under the BPCIA, there must be "no clinically
meaningful differences.., in terms of the safety, purity, and potency." 84
Beyond biosimilarity, a follow-on may be found "interchangeable" with its
reference product, the original biologic, if it is shown that: (1) the biosimilar
will have the same clinical effect as the reference biologic for every individual
patient; and (2) for biologics administered more than once (as most biologics
are), switching between the reference biologic and the biosimilar poses no
76.
MARK MCCAMISH,
ZARXIOTM (FILGRASTIM): SANDOZ, A NOVARTIS COMPANY:
PRESENTATION TO THE ONCOLOGIC DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2015), http://www.fda.gov/

downloads/AdvisoryCommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/OncologicDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/U
CM 4 3 i1 i9.pdf.

77. See supra note ii.
78. Hussain, supranote 63.
79. This Article focuses on the U.S. regime, but the situation is similar elsewhere; the U.S.
law is modeled on the E.U.'s biosimilar regime, and other countries have adopted this approach.
8o. See infra Part II.D.2.
8i. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148,

§§

7001-03, 124 Stat. 804-21 (2010) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)).

82.

Id.

83.

42U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A).

84.

Id. §262(i)(2).
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additional safety or efficacy risk compared to the use of the reference product
alone.a5
For purposes of price reduction, an interchangeable follow-on represents
the closest parallel to a generic small-molecule drug. The BPCIA provides that
pharmacists may automatically substitute such interchangeables for
originator biologics, just as generic small-molecule drugs are automatically
substituted for brand-name drugs.8 6 However, for the reasons discussed above,
absent follow-on access to manufacturing details, achieving interchangeability
is highly unlikely.8 7
2.

FDA Implementation

The statutory approach described above is quite broad, but the FDA's
implementation is significantly more detailed. Although the FDA has not
promulgated regulation,88 it has issued multiple draft guidances on the
biosimilar approval pathway, and in particular what needs to be demonstrated
8
to show biosimilarity. 9
Notably, the FDA has eschewed a rigid structure for demonstrating
biosimilarity in favor of a risk-based, case-by-case, totality-of-the-evidence
approach.90 This flexibility contrasts with the agency's rigid stance postapproval discussed in Part II.C, and is discussed in Part V.
Under the FDA's approach, demonstrating biosimilarity requires a
stepwise decrease in risk and uncertainty as characterization of the follow-on
biologic progresses through several stages, moving from structural and
functional analysis through animal data and finally human clinical data on
pharmacology, immunogenicity, and potentially safety and efficacy if

85.

Id. § 262 (i) (3), (k)( 4 ).

86. Falit et al., supra note 12, at 298.
87. See supra Part II.B.
88. In general, the FDA operates in significant part through guidance, a practice that has
drawn severe criticism from some scholars. See Lars Noah, Governance by theBackdoor: Administrative
Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 90 (2014). Although guidance does not provide
binding law, it does allow for greater agency flexibility in cases where knowledge is rapidly
evolving. See infra Part V.
89. See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
BIOSIMILARs: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (Rev. 1,

2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.. ./Guidances/UCM2 730 1.pdf, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY DATA TO SUPPORT
A DEMONSTRATION OF BiOSIMILARIry TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2014),

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnforrnation/Guidance/
UCM3 9 7017.pdf; FOOD & DRUGADMIN. ETAL., supranote 3o; FOOD & DRUGADMIN. ETAL., U.S. DEPT
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILAR1TY TO A
THERAPEUTIC PROTEIN PRODUCT TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2015), http://

www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnforma6on/Guidances/UCM291
13 4 .pdf.
o

9 .

o

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., supra note 3 , at 8.
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needed.9' Throughout, the process emphasizes decreasing the risk and
uncertainty that remain from limitations of the prior step. The final step is
clinical trials to demonstrate that whatever uncertainty remains from
characterization has minimal effects on patients.92
III. PROCESS DETAILS AS TRADE SECRETS: THE NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

This Part will discuss in detail the efficiency losses, static and dynamic,
associated with current trade secrecy practices in biologics manufacturing. To
set the stage for the normative discussion, this Part begins with a general
overview of basic patent and trade secret doctrine and of the economics of
trade secrecy. The general overview does not fully apply to manufacturing
process information submitted to the FDA. Nonetheless, it provides important
context.
A.

PATENTAAD TRADE SECRET DOCTRINE

Boilerplate patent law holds that firms must choose between having a
patent on an inventive product or process and keeping it a trade secret. Patent
law's disclosure requirement is reflected both in the text of the patent statute
and in case law.9s

See id. at 9-17. Structural analysis measures the physical characteristics of the protein,
91.
and faces the limitations described above. Id. at 9. Functional analysis evaluates the performance
of the product compared to the reference product in in vitro assays such as "biological assays,
binding assays, and enzyme kinetics." Id. at so. Animal data on toxicity can help demonstrate
safety; animal studies on pharmacodynamics (how the drug acts on the body) and
pharmacokinetics (how the body metabolizes the drug) can help demonstrate similarity to the
reference product, and animal immunogenicity studies can demonstrate differences between the
reference and follow-on even though they poorly predict human immune responses. Id. at 11-1 2.
92.
At least one challenge with the approach of using clinical trials as the final arbiter of
similarity parallels the growing recognition that clinical trials are generally too small and too short
to evaluate negative effects of drugs that may only arise in the longer term or in limited
populations. See Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, PostmarketingSurveillance and Adverse Drug
Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future Needs, 281 JAMA 824, 824 (1999). Post-market
surveillance is the preferred approach to deal with these issues. Id. If, however, biosimilars differ
in ways that would only be noticed in post-market surveillance-as seems likely, based on the
path-dependence differences described above, see supra Part II.B-then surveillance of the
reference product will not help avoid those problems. Of course, to the extent that
interchangeables became possible, surveillance of the reference product would suffice.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) (2012) (requiring that a patent "contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make and use the
same, and... set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor orjoint inventor of carrying
out the invention"). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all appeals in
patent cases, has held that this section contains both a requirement to "describe" the invention
in structural terms and to enable the invention. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 20 1O). Although the written description and enablement requirements are
similar, they are not identical. See id. ("[A] Ithough written description and enablement often rise
and fall together, requiring a written description of the invention plays a vital role in curtailing
claims that do not require undue experimentation to make and use, and thus satisfy enablement,
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While disclosure's doctrinal foundation is clear, the extent to which this
goal is normatively central to patent law remains contested. Scholars have
argued both for94 and against95 its centrality.96 Additionally, the extent to
which patents practically aid the spread of knowledge remains a contested
empirical question. Although the answer likely varies across areas of scientific
and technological inquiry, the majority view is that disclosure is often
inadequate.97 This inadequacy may be a function of current legal
requirements or of the inability of current patent institutions to enforce these
requirements.
This Article does not take a view on whether patent law generally should
take disclosure as a central normative goal. Rather, it makes the case that
greater disclosure of biologic manufacturing processes is likelyto improve
efficiency substantially, both static and dynamic. Whether greater disclosure
should be achieved through the patent system or through other mechanisms
is a question to which this Article turns in Part IV.
In the remainder of this Part, this Article makes a detailed case for why
trade secrecy is often privately valuable but only socially valuable in certain
cases. In the case of biologics manufacturing, indefinite trade secrecy is on
balance socially deleterious.

but that have not been invented, and thus cannot be described."). In contrast with enablement,
which primarily serves the disclosure function, written description also serves a notice function.
94. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Role of PatentLaw in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 1oo9, 1012 (2oo8) ("[M]any familiar provisions of the patent statute may be viewed as
incentives for codification of otherwise tacit knowledge .... "); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent
Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2009) (Arguing for disclosure's "centrality in the patent
system"); Sean B. Seymore, The TeachingFunction of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627
(2010) (arguing for strong disclosure and that "[i]t is now time to transform the patent into a
readable teaching document").
95. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The MisunderstoodFunction of Disclosure in PatentLaw, 23 HARV.J.L.
& TECH. 401, 403 (2010) ("[D]isclosure is both ineffective and potentially poisonous to larger
social goals."); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in PatentLaw, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 146 (2oo6)
("[D]isclosure obligations [are] inconsistent with the theoretical justifications of patent
law .. "); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 1 1o MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012)
("Disclosure theory cannot.. . support the modern patent system.").
96. For a useful review of scholarly views in this area, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 546-47 (2012). Ouellette suggests that
rather than questioning disclosure's value as a rationale for a patent system, its value should be
examined taking the system as a given; that is, since a patent system exists, what is the value of
disclosure requirements, and is that value sufficient? Id. at 548.
97. See, e.g., Subhashini Chandrasekharan et al., ProprietayScience, Open Science and the Role
of Patent Disclosure: The Case of Zinc-Finger Proteins, 27 NATuRE BIOTECHNOLOGY 140 (2009)
(discussing lack of disclosure in the context of zinc-finger protein patents); Mark A. Lemley,
Ignoring Patents,2oo8 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 22 n.16 ("Empirical research suggests that scientists
don't in fact gain much of their knowledge from patents, turning instead to other sources.").
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THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE SECRECY: GENERAL CONSIDERA TIONS

In general, as various surveys have shown, manufacturing firms across
different industries frequently use secrecy to protect both product and
process information.R Secrecy appears particularly useful for processes.99 This
differential value arises from the challenges in detecting process patent
infringement and, in some cases, the difficulty of reverse engineering.
Although secrecy clearly confers private value to the company, scholars
have debated the extent to which such secrecy should be encouraged through
the apparatus of trade secret law, now adopted by 47 states through the
mechanism of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA").°° Under the UTSA,
the definition of what constitutes a trade secret is broad-any information
that derives actual or potential economic value from "not being readily
ascertainable" and which is the subject of measures "reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy" is included.1o
In a prominent series of articles starting in 1998, Professor Robert Bone
has argued that any protection against rent-dissipating "secrecy arms races"
provided by trade secrecy law is outweighed by its disadvantages.102 Bone
argues that unlike patent law, trade secrecy encourages duplicative effort and
0
retards cumulative innovation. 3
Other scholars have countered that trade secrecy creates incentives to
innovate in those contexts where an invention does not meet the standards
for patent validity or where seeking and enforcing a patent (particularly given
the well-known practical limitations of the patent system) would be
98. SeeWesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting TheirIntellectualAssets: AppropriabilityConditions and
Why U.S. ManufacturingFirms Patent (or Not) 1o (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7552, 2000) (finding, based on survey of R&D managers of manufacturing firms
administered in the United States in 1994, that across industries secrecy was more effective than
patents for both product and process inventions); see also John E. Jankowski, Business Use of
Intellectual Property Protection Documented in NSF Survey, INFOBRIEF (Nat'l Ctr. for Sci. & Eng'g
Statistics), Feb. 2012, at 5 (finding that in 2oo8, more than 50% of businesses "with R&D activity"
rated secrecy very important or somewhat important).
99. See Cohen et al., supra note 98, at i o (noting that secrecy was reported to be the most
effective strategy for protecting process innovations).
1oo. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), NDAS FOR FREE, http://www.ndasforfree.com/
UTSA.htmI (last visited Jan. 1o, 2016) (listing states adopting the UTSA). Only New York,
Massachusetts, and North Carolina have not adopted the UTSA. Id.
1o1.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1986) (amended 1985).
Robert G. Bone, Exploring the Boundaries of Competitive Secrecy: An Essay on the
102.
See, e.g.,
Limits of Trade Secret Law, in 13 LAw, INFORMATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 99 (Eli
Lederman & Ron Shapira eds., 2001); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 241 (1998) [hereinafter Bone, A New Look]; Robert G.
Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundationsof Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REv. 1803 (2014) [hereinafter
Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations];Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the Requirement
of Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 46 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 201 1).
103. Bone, A New Look, supranote 102, at 266-67.
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prohibitively costly.-'4 The prominent Carnegie Mellon survey on
manufacturing firms' strategies for appropriability of intellectual assets
indicates that, at least as of 1994 (when the survey was conducted), these
arguments had merit. "5 Respondents to that survey stated that difficulty
demonstrating novelty and application cost represented reasons not to
, °6
patent.
Proponents of trade secrecy also argue that trade secrecy law offers a
robust mechanism for overcoming Arrow's information paradox and
fostering licensing markets that result in cumulative innovation.o7 Although
this argument seems plausible in principle, its empirical foundation is
unclear. Although scholars who study technology licensing empirically have
argued that patent licensing markets provide a vehicle by which relevant trade
secret knowledge is transferred,' °8 they have not suggested the existence of
robust markets for such knowledge independent of the underlying patent.
When played out across many different types of invention, these debates
over the comparative social value of trade secrecy can be very difficult to parse,
let alone ground empirically.°9 Additionally, these abstract debates tend not
to account for the incentives of codification and other policy considerations
relevant to trade secrecy in heavily regulated industries. For these industries,
the common law UTSA is much less relevant than the regulatory architecture
set up by the Freedom of Information Act, the Trade Secrets Act, and the
0
agency's organic statute."1
This Article addresses this debate in a specific inventive and regulatory
context-that of trade secrecy with respect to details of biologics
In this context, the information in question has
manufacturing.'
tremendous value, both private and social. However, private value is realized
in a regime-trade secrecy-that creates very significant problems for
purposes of realizing social value.

104.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 6t
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets , i MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 1 (2007).

See generally Cohen et al., supranote 9 8.
See id. atfig.5.
107.
Arrow's information paradox highlights the peculiar status of information: It is valuable
only when disclosed but also (absent mechanisms like intellectual property) loses its private value
o
when disclosed. See Arrow, supra note 7 ,at 614-16; see also Lemley, supra note 1o4, at 336
firms
to overcome Arrow's information paradox).
may
allow
secrecy
that
trade
(arguing
1o8.
See generally ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF
INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001). The fact that trade secret knowledge necessary
to practice the patentwould need to be transferred through a license of course calls into question
the comprehensiveness of the patent disclosure.
See generally Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations,supra note 102.
1o9.
1 1o. See infra Part III.C.
i 11. For a discussion in other specific contexts, see, for example, Chandrasekharan et al.,
supra note 97; Ouellette, supranote 96.
105.

io6.
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C. TRADE SECRETS IN THE BIOLOGICS MANUFACTURJNG CONTEXT
1.

The Private Value of Trade Secrecy

In the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey, as well as a 2oo8 NSF survey, the
biopharmaceutical manufacturing sector indicated significant reliance on
trade secrecy, particularly in the context of manufacturing processes; indeed,
in 1994, trade secrecy for biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes was
rated nearly twice as effective as patents."- These surveys do not distinguish

small-molecule manufacturing and biologics manufacturing. However, as a
logical matter, the regulatory requirement that follow-on manufacturers
essentially reverse engineer the originator's process,"3

coupled with the

difficulty of doing so, presumably make trade secrecy over the details of
biologics manufacturing extremely valuable. These process details include
characteristics of the vector and cell line used, cell line growth conditions,

and purification processes.' 14
To be sure, biologics firms typically seek extensive composition-of-matter
patent protection."5 However, in keeping with scholars' suspicions of the
practical value of patent disclosure, composition-of-matter patents do not

generally provide follow-on firms details regarding manufacturing process.
Even in cases where biopharmaceutical firms file process patents, these
patents are less than fully revealing. For example, in 2oo6, a decade after it
filed the key product patent on its anti-TNF

antibody Humira,-

6

the

originator firm Abbott (now Abbvie) filed a patent application on methods
for improving anti-TNF antibody expression through improvements in cell
culture media, which evolved into several patents."7 However, because these
patents obviously cover only one portion of the process, their value in terms

112.

Cohen et al., supra note 98, tbl.2.
See supra Part II.C.
1 14.
See supra Part II.
115. See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals- Do We
Really Need Both? 18 MICH. TELECOMM. &TECH. L. REv. 419 (2O12). Although the fact of extensive
protection is known, the full scope and characteristics of this patent protection are not easy to
determine. Unlike Hatch-Waxman, which sets up an FDA-administered registry known as the
Orange Book onto which originator firms place patents that "could reasonably be asserted" against
a generic competitor, BPCIA does not set up a patent registry. See42 U.S.C. § 262 (1)
(1) (D) (2012 ).
Instead it enunciates a highly complex set of procedures though which originator and follow-on
firms exchange information regarding patents. See id. 262(l). Follow-on firms planning to enter
with biosimilar products must "slog through" a variety of databases, proprietary and
nonproprietary. E-mail from Shashank Upadhye, former Vice President & Glob. Head of
Intellectual Prop., Apotex, to Arti K Rai (June 9, 2014, 1:37 PM) (on file with authors).
116. The key product patent (patent number 6,090,382) was filed in February 1996. Human
Antibodies That Bind Human TNFa, U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382 (filed Feb. 9, 1996).
117. See, e.g., Dual Variable Domain Immunoglobins and Uses Thereof, U.S. Patent No.
8,735,546 B2 (filed Aug. 2, 2011); Methods of Producing Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibodies in
Mammalian Cell Culture, U.S. Patent No. 8,663,945 B2 (filed Nov. 30, 201 1).
113.
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of disclosure was limited. For this reason, as discussed earlier, follow-on firms
8
must essentially reverse engineer processes."
Going forward, from a private value standpoint, it is possible that the
BPCIA's regulatory procedure for exchange of patent information may make
originator process patents easier to enforce than the ordinary process patent
and thus more attractive. As noted in the Introduction, the procedure
facilitates identification of infringement by the follow-on applicant by setting
up a procedure through which the follow-on firm discloses the contents of its
FDA application to the originator. As with the originator application, this
application reveals details of the manufacturing process.
On the other hand, the highly confused nature of the law interpreting
the patent statute's "safe harbor" for patent infringement in the context of
regulatory submissions may make manufacturing method patents
unattractive."9 In two recent opinions, the Federal Circuit has reached
arguably divergent conclusions regarding the extent to which infringement
of patents in the context of generating information collected for purposes of
compliance with FDA regulatory processes falls under the safe harbor.2o
Other aspects of the legal and regulatory scheme surrounding
manufacturing processes affirmatively enhance the private value of trade
secrecy. Although an originator firm's manufacturing process forms the
template against which the FDA judges all biosimilar applicants, current
federal statutory law appears strictly to bar any revelation of originator process
details by the FDA. Both the D.C. Circuit and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
have interpreted the relevant statutes (the Freedom of Information Act and
the Trade Secrets Act) to encompass as a trade secret "a secret, commercially
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making,
preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities.""' Moreover,

although the Trade Secrets Act does allow agencies to release trade secrets to
the extent that such release is "authorized by law,"12 other statutory law

118. Additionally, in a significant number of cases, patents cannot. contain all relevant
information. As discussed further in Part V,patents are typically filed at the beginning of clinical
trials, and the manufacturing process is often altered over the course of these trials.
ig. Broadly speaking, under the safe harbor provisions, firms using patented technology to
prepare for a required FDA filing are immune from patent infringement suits based on that
conduct. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3 d 1348, 1359-61 (Fed.
120.
Cir. 2012) (holding that the safe harbor provision applied to manufacturing method patent, even
post-approval); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F. 3 d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir.
201 1) (holding that the safe harbor provision did not apply to post-approval activity).
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 128o, 1288 (D.C.
121.
Cir. 1983); accord Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (Oth Cir.
199o); see also CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 83o F.2d 1132, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
that Exemption 4 of FOIA determines not only what the federal government must release in
response to a FOIA request but also what the Trade Secrets Act allows the government to release).
In relevant part, the text of the Trade Secrets Act reads:
122.
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doesn't confer any clear affirmative authority. To the contrary, section 331 (j)
of the FDA's organic statute prohibits the agency from releasing to the public
information "concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is
entitled to protection.",23
For these reasons, while trade secrecy is quite attractive from a private
standpoint, greater disclosure is likely to have significant social value.
2.

The Social Value of Disclosure

Most straightforwardly, disclosure would significantly reduce the amount
of largely duplicative research that follow-on researchers must do. As
discussed in Part II, the current state of analytical science is such that even
innovator firms cannot use analytic techniques to guarantee absolute identity
of molecule between batches. Instead, an innovator manufacturer must
demonstrate "consistency in manufactur[ing], with attributes that fall within
a set of acceptable specification criteria that regulators have agreed to
through a history of testing and characterization."124
In contrast with originator firms and regulators, follow-on firms do not
have access to this detailed prior knowledge of manufacturing processes.
Rather, to create a biosimilar, the developing company attempts to reverse
engineer the manufacturing process of the reference product.125 In some

Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department
or agency thereof,... publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner
or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of
his employment or official duties.., which information concerns or relates to the
trade secrets... of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association ...
shall be fined under this tide, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
shall be removed from office or employment.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012) (emphasis added).
123.
21 U.S.C. § 331(J) (2012). Section 3 5 5 (i) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act does
give the FDA expansive authority to impose on regulated parties "other conditions" that "relat[e]
to the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. § 3 5 5 (i)(1). Moreover, in January 2OO1, the
FDA did rely in part on this authority to propose disclosure rules with respect to human gene
therapy clinical data. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity 467,
479 in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH,
supranote 102. Indeed, many of the same innovation arguments we engage in this Article have
been used by advocates of greater clinical trial data disclosure. See generally COMM. ON STRATAGIES
FOR RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., SHARING
CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISK (2015) (collecting references).
However, subsection Cj)
appears to single out process details as a different type of information
than clinical trial data. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (j).
124. Berkowitz et al., supranote 55, at 529.
125.
Telephone Interview with Bruce Leicher, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Momenta
Pharm. (Oct. 18, 2012). Although Momenta has demonstrated very high levels of expertise in
this area by winning approval of generic versions of the complex mixtures Lovenox and
Copaxone, its success hinges on better reverse engineering of manufacturing, not on simply
understanding the resulting product and matching it.
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cases, this reverse engineering is impossible.12 6 Even in those cases where it is
possible, it is very expensive.127 Moreover, the biosimilar may direct its work
towards duplicating idiosyncratic choices made by the reference sponsor.2 8

This path-dependence restricts the development of biosimilars for reasons
unconnected with the safety and efficacy of the biologic.
One counterargument is that the development of greater reverseengineering expertise, and potentially greater analytical capabilities used for
that reverse engineering, may itself be a useful form of innovation. This
argument has some validity, particularly with respect to development of
analytical capabilities. As noted, however, the relatively narrow focus on
choices made by the originator limits the larger social benefit from the reverse
engineering.
Current estimates indicate that repeating clinical trials in order to show
biosimilarity or interchangeability is likely to cost as much as $ 10O million to
$250 million.129 In comparison, the cost of completing bioequivalence studies
for a small molecule can be as low as $1 million to $2 million.,so Because of
this very significant barrier to entry, true generic competition in biologics will,
at least for the foreseeable future, be difficult to achieve. Instead, as a
prominent FTC report that analyzed the issue concluded, competition from
biosimilar and even interchangeables may resemble competition between
branded biologics.131 With two or three biosimilar entrants, prices may
decrease by 1O-3O%.32 Notably, the FTC predictions are roughly in line with

the price reductions biosimilars have generated in Europe.'133
Additionally, greater disclosure would foster cumulative innovation, and
could catalyze work into the aspects of biologics manufacturing that are most
unpredictable and thus would benefit most greatly from improved
knowledge. Increased disclosure would also enhance nascent public-private
efforts to produce fundamental knowledge about biologics manufacturing. As
discussed in Part II.C, current incentives to produce this fundamental
knowledge are far from socially optimal.
The challenge lies in generating greater disclosure and fundamental
knowledge without inappropriately reducing originator incentives to
innovate. Part IV discusses this important challenge at length and considers
policy prescriptions.

126.
127.
128.

Id. See generally Berkowitz et al., supra note 55.
Telephone Interview with Bruce Leicher, supra note 125.
Id. See generally Walsh, supranote 15.

129.

Walsh, supranote 15, at 995.

13o.
H. Grabowski et al., Biosimilars, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH ECONOMics 86, 90
(AnthonyJ. Culyer ed., 2014).
131.

FED. TRADE COMM.,

EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG

COMPETITION 13 (2009).
132.

133.

Id. at 23.
Megerlin et al., supra note 18, at i8o6.
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IV. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

This Part turns to policy prescriptions for addressing the secrecy
problem. Policymakers could use mandates or incentives to elicit information
from originator firms, implemented either through the patent system or
FDA's regulatory system. Additionally, public funding of manufacturing
research, coupled with greater standardization of manufacturing methods,
could help solve the problem of secret methods.
A. DISCLOSURE THROUGH REGULATORYLEVERS
Incentives or mandates for firms to disclose their manufacturing
methods could operate in one of two ways: (1) through the patent system; or
(2) by tying disclosure to regulatory approval and oversight of biologics. This
Subpart discusses both options, concluding that FDA regulatory approval
provides the better institutional setting.
1.

Patent Disclosure

The patent statute requires disclosure sufficient to show the ordinary
scientist working in the field how to "make and use" the invention claimed.134
As a doctrinal matter, patents might therefore seem a logical locus for
potential disclosure reform. In the context of biologics patent applications,
however, disclosure is ineffective for at least two reasons. First, as with other
patent applications, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") may not
have sufficient resources or expertise to monitor effective disclosure.135
Second, and more conceptually, any disclosure made by the originator
biologic firm at the time it files its patent application may have only partial
overlap with the disclosure needed by a follow-on biosimilar manufacturer
(or, for that matter, with the disclosure needed to stimulate cumulative
innovation). This is because biologics patent applications are typically filed
before clinical trials begin, so the biologic product and its associated process
that are ultimately approved by the FDA will likely have been altered by the
time it is approved.
Consider, for example, the principal patent on the blockbuster biologic
Enbrel. This patent describes expressing the protein in any of at least eight
bacterial strains, yeast, and at least ten different cell culture types from
6
multicellular organisms including hamsters, monkeys, and humans.'s
Indeed, the patent mentions at least 2o different possibilities for expressing
the protein in yeast alone.137 And while the patent does describe specific

134.
135.

35 u.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process,

51 HOUS. L. REV. 50 3 (2013).

136. DNA Encoding a Chimeric Polypeptide Comprising the Extracellular Domain of TNF
Receptor Fused to IGG, Vectors, and Host Cells, U.S. Patent No. 5,447,851 (filed Apr. 2, 1992).
137. Id.
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examples-likely those used in the discovering laboratory-it notes that
"those of skill will appreciate that the following examples are intended to be
exemplary only and that numerous changes, modifications and alterations
can be employed without departing from the spirit and scope of the
invention.",3 8 Pfizer undoubtedly uses such modifications in the commercial
manufacture of Enbrel, but the nature, extent, and effect of those
modifications is completely unknown. And, as described above, precise
variations in manufacturing methods can have significant clinical impacts.39
Thus, from a large menu of possibilities-and, indeed, from similar
possibilities not specifically mentioned-a much smaller subset matches the
FDA's definition of biosimilarity.140
The Enbrel patent disclosure thus exemplifies both problems noted
above. The first problem is the PTO's decision to allow such a broad patent.
Arguably, as Dmitry Karshtedt has suggested, because biologics cannot be
described precisely by structure, the only composition-of-matter patents that
should be allowed on biologics are so-called product-by-process patents.,4,
These patents are essentially process patents, as the patentee's coverage is
limited to the particular method it has used.'42 However, a product-by-process
patent filed at the time when clinical testing began might well discuss a
process different from the process Pfizer and the FDA ultimately chose for
commercial manufacture. Not only would the patent's disclosure be
unhelpful to biosimilar firms, but the patent itself would fail to protect Pfizer's
biologic.
In order to channel a more robust biologic disclosure through the patent
system, patent law might allow pioneer firms to seek broad patent protection
at the outset (e.g., along the lines of the Enbrel patent,) but condition the
patent's continued validity on an updated disclosure that enabled one skilled
in the art to make the biologic to the specifications identified in any Biologics
Licensing Application ("BLA") covering the patented biologic.'43 Thus, when
a firm received a BLA on its patented biologic, it would need to supplement
the patent disclosure with whatever information was necessary to ensure that
competitors could actually make a biosimilar once the patent expired. More
broadly, patent law could require that, for any patented product or process
that is subject to regulatory approval, the patent disclosure must be so

138.

Id.

139.

See supra Part II.A.

140.

See supra Part II. D. 2.

141.

Karshtedt, supra note 25, at 139.

142.

Id.

143. Some complications might arise when the patentee and the BLA sponsor are different
entities, though typically the BIA sponsor would be expected to be either the owner, assignee,
or exclusive licensee of a patent covering the sponsored biologic.
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supplemented.'44 The expert regulatory agency in question (here the FDA)
could police the supplementary disclosure, presumably with greater efficacy
than the PTO.'45
Although the patent statute currently contains no mechanism for
mandatory supplementation, legislative implementation of such a mechanism
would force firms to choose between patents and maintaining secrecy over
production methods. That is, legislation could force actual implementation
of the boilerplate requirement that firms must choose between patents and
trade secrecy.
Whether this approach would actually promote enough disclosure is a
harder question. Frequently, the choice might be an easy one with no benefit
from disclosure. Given the current 12-year regulatory exclusivity for biologics
clinical trial data, firms might rely on that exclusivity and simply forgo
patenting.4 6 In that case, no disclosure would be forthcoming. Congress
could, of course, shorten the regulatory exclusivity term, thereby making
patents more attractive. However, as various scholars have now noted,
regulatory exclusivity incentives are much more precisely tailored than the
patent regime for products that require large research and development
investment precisely because of regulatory requirements.47
Overall, channeling a meaningful disclosure requirement for biologic
manufacturing through the patent system has the potential to accelerate
biosimilar development. However, the discrepancy between what is required
to make a regulated product and what is required to make an earlier version
on which patent protection is sought suggests that locating a robust disclosure

144. The absence of an Orange-Book-style registry of patents covering licensed biologics
makes this endeavor more complicated than a hypothetical analogous pharmaceutical regime.
This difficulty might be overcome by integrating the patent-exchange mechanism described in
the BPCIA; a sponsor could be required to certify that any patents listed in the BPCIA "patent
dance" were appropriately supplemented at the time of the BLA's grant. See infra notes 149-51.
145. Interestingly, the U.S. Code currently contains a provision calling for the FDA to assist
the PTO in ordinary examination of drug patent applications:
The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] is authorized and directed, upon
request from the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, to furnish full and
complete information with respect to such questions relating to drugs as the
Director may submit concerning any patent application. The Secretary is further
authorized, upon receipt of any such request, to conduct or cause to be conducted,
such research as may be required.
U.S.C. § 3 7 2 (d) (2012). To our knowledge, this provision has never been utilized.
146. Yaniv Heled has argued that firms should be required to choose between exclusivity and
patent protection in any case. See generallyHeled, supranote 15.
5 The proposal here would create
a similar choice, though indirectly.
147. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007); Arti K. Rai, BuildingaBetterInnovation System: Combining
Facially Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUs. L. REv. 1037 (2oo8);
Benjamin N. Roin, UnpatentableDrugsand the Standards ofPatentability,87 TEX. L. REV. 503 (2009).
21
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requirement within the FDA regulatory oversight structure is the better
option.
2.

Disclosure Through the FDA Regulatory Structure

Public disclosure of precise and enabling manufacturing methods could
be made a condition of FDA approval (in a mandate-based version) or could
be incentivized with an additional period of FDA-enforced regulatory
exclusivity (in an incentive-based version). Because the FDA already serves as
the gatekeeper for regulatory approval, and already has the necessary
expertise to evaluate disclosure of biologic characteristics and manufacturing
methods, it could ensure that manufacturers actually disclose the relevant
information.
This assurance would be especially strong if the public disclosure were
the same as the disclosure to the FDA-that is, if the Chemistry and
Manufacturing Controls ("CMC") section of the BLA were publicly disclosed
upon BLA approval. Under such a requirement, the sponsor's interest in
disclosing inadequately to limit eventual competition would be countered by
its interest in disclosing fully to win FDA approval to enter the market in the
first place. 148
Disclosure linked to the CMC would also address any objection that
transmission of trade secret-based knowledge would be excessively
burdensome because the knowledge in question is tacit, not codified. In this
case, the CMC requirement already mandates knowledge codification.
There is some precedent for legislation promoting disclosure of
manufacturing methods linked to regulatory approval-though the existing
disclosure regime is one-way, circumscribed, and in the opposite direction. As
noted above, the BPCIA sets up a complex system of patent exchange for the
purpose of facilitating patent enforcement when a biosimilar application is
filed.149 As part of this mechanism, within 20 days of the FDA's acceptance of
a biosimilar application, the applicant provides the reference product
sponsor-that is, the firm that makes the original biologic-with its full FDA
application packet.,5o This packet includes the CMC section detailing its
manufacturing methods in their entirety.
The BPCIA's information exchange is intended to facilitate the
enforcement of the pioneer firm's patents on the biologic and its

148. Although a full CMC disclosure would generally allow for replication of the biologic for
a follow-on entrant, in some cases deposition of the cell line might also be necessary.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2012). The mechanisms of this patent exchange are highly
convoluted and not relevant to the purposes of this Article. For a detailed summary, see Michael
P. Dougherty, The New Follow-on-Biologics Law: A Section by Section Analysis of the Patent Litigation
Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2oo9, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231
(2010). Notably, the Federal Circuit has recently held that the patent-exchange provisions are not
mandatory. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.,
150.

42 U.S.C.

§ 262(0(2).

794

F. 3 d 1347, 1354-57 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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manufacturing process. The information thus may be viewed only by the
reference product sponsor's counsel, may not be disclosed to other
employees, and may be used only to determine the possibility of patent
infringement.'s But the BPCIA provision also illustrates the extent to which
the key codified information is found not in patents but in FDA regulatory
submissions.
An FDA-centered approach poses some challenges, and a mandatory
disclosure regime would be especially challenging. Most obviously, as a matter
of political economy, it is unclear whether any powerful interest group would
support mandatory disclosure. Insurance companies might have some
interest, though they might be more interested in attempts to achieve public
sector price regulation, on which they could then piggyback.Isz
More substantively, although certain claims about inadequate incentives
as a consequence of mandatory disclosure might have questionable
legitimacy, originator firms could legitimately point to the emerging global
market for biologics in countries with limited patent enforcement and limited
or nonexistent regulatory exclusivity regimes.'53 Mandatory disclosure could
spur very swift competition within these countries. Biopharmaceutical firms
rely heavily on arguments regarding global competitive impact in current
debates over public release of clinical trial data submitted to the FDA. '54
Additionally, mandatory disclosure that applied retroactively, to
manufacturing method information already submitted to the FDA, might
constitute a taking. In the 1984 case Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Supreme
Court held that Monsanto had established a property interest under Missouri
trade secret law in the health, safety, and environmental information it had
submitted to the EPA for purposes of obtaining regulatory approval.155
Moreover, according to the Court, public release of data submitted prior to
congressional enactment of a law placing Monsanto on notice that it should
not expect data submissions to be confidential constituted a taking. 56 Lower

151. Id. § 262 (0 (1) (B)-(D). Whether these requirements are readily enforceable is a matter of
some debate, especially given the secrecy surrounding manufacturing operations normally.
152. As discussed in Part II, price regulation substantially misses the mark from the
perspective of innovation.
COMM. ON STRATAGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA, supra note 123,
153.
app. C, at 26o (citing submissions from AbbVie and PhRMA arguing that China, Brazil, Australia, Chile,
Mexico, Peru, Egypt, and Malaysia have limited regimes for regulatory exclusivity).
154. See generally id.
155. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
156. Id. at 1o1o-14. While we do not necessarily accept the view that mandatory disclosure
would constitute a taking under Ruckelshaus-andindeed do not address the full contours of that
argument here-its potential applicability nonetheless raises substantial legal and political
economy challenges.

2o16]

MANUFACTURING BARRIERS

1055

courts analyzing takings challenges to retroactive mandatory trade secrets
disclosure have been similarly favorable to such challenges.,57
Offering additional exclusivity as an incentive to biologics manufacturers
to encourage voluntary disclosure would avoid takings concerns. The obvious
objection is that firms would accept an additional regulatory exclusivity period
only for those products where the period was longer than the likely market
delay achieved by keeping manufacturing methods secret. Such gaming might
be mitigated by requiring firms to opt in on a firm-wide rather than productby-product basis. Moreover, for firms that are relatively risk-averse (for
example, firms that have only one product), a guaranteed period of
additional exclusivity, even if relatively short, could be superior to the risky
exclusivity provided by trade secrecy.
Incentives could also take the form of accelerated FDA approval. As
contrasted with exclusivity extensions, such acceleration might not only create
less deadweight loss but might actually be more attractive to the originator.
Given discount rates and technological advancement, reducing the time
required for product development programs to reach the market and begin
enjoying positive cash flow may be more important than additional regulatory
exclusivity many years in the future.
The timing of disclosure also poses an interesting puzzle. In order to
preserve originator incentives, particularly against the risk of very swift
competition in countries without robust patent and regulatory exclusivities,
disclosure should presumably not take place immediately upon originator
approval. At the same time, disclosure occurring after patents and regulatory
exclusivity expire would be too late to be useful for most follow-on firms.,58
The details of precisely when disclosure took place would therefore be very
important.
Overall, disclosure administered through the FDA, most likely through
some type of incentive scheme, has significant potential. Such disclosure
would be helpful not only for purposes of producing competition but also as
a rich source of information from which the larger scientific community could
actively derive fundamental knowledge about manufacturing biologics.
Independent of whether such disclosure goes forward, however, nascent
efforts by agencies like NIST to develop fundamental knowledge of biologic
manufacturing processes and promote standardization of these processes
should be encouraged. Quite appropriately, NIST's efforts attempt to
leverage collective private sector knowledge. NIST thus draws upon a history

157. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3 d 24 (ist Cir. 2002). Some have argued that
retroactive application of the BPCIA pathway to originator manufacturers will inevitably
constitute a taking because the FDA will have to compare the biosimilars' manufacturing process
to that of the originator. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The ConstitutionalProtectionof TradeSecrets
and Patents Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2oo9, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
285 (201 1). This latter argument has yet to achieve traction, however.
158. That said, even disclosure at a late date would contribute to the stock of knowledge.
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of government-encouraged collaborative research and development among
competitors. However, as we discuss below, while collaborative research and
development efforts have generally involved competitors that are more or less
similarly situated, the problem space in biologics manufacturing is more
complex.
B.

KNOWLEDGE GENERA TION THROUGH COLLABORA T1vE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT

Understanding the challenges individual firms face in generating
fundamental knowledge of biologics has led scholars and government actors
to support not only public funding of such research but also in many cases
private and public-private collaborative research and development.,59 As an
empirical matter, however, collaboration between competitors is difficult,
particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry. In this industry, studies of
actual collaborative agreements reveal careful (and presumably laborious)
allocation of future intellectual property rights to be an important part of
contract design.' 6o
In the biologics manufacturing context, the collaboration puzzle is even
more complex. While most research and development collaborations involve
firms that are roughly similarly situated, in this context players with relevant
knowledge (or at least need for access to knowledge) include not only
originator firms but also biosimilar firms. Given the disparity of competitive
position, ex ante allocation of intellectual property rights seems unlikely. On
the positive side, so long as sufficient ex ante incentives can be devised, the
resulting knowledge will go into the public domain, with presumed additional
spillover benefits.
Next, this Article gives some general background on the NIST
Biomanufacturing Initiative. It then discusses three cases exemplifying
different strategies on the part of firms and government actors. In the first
case, improvements in fundamental knowledge appear to be perceived
favorably by all parties, whether originator or biosimilar, FDA or NIST. In the
second case, neither originator firms nor biosimilar firms are participating.
In this case, originator firms may lack relevant knowledge, in part as a
consequence of inflexible regulatory processes. Meanwhile, biosimilar firms
may view the knowledge they have as a core competitive advantage. And in a

159.

The National

Cooperative Research Act of 1984 explicitly encourages

such

collaboration. See generally National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 43O1-43o6 (2012).
16o.
See, e.g., Suzanne E. Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Incomplete Contracting and the
Structure of R&D Joint Venture Contracts, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
201 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004). The Majewski and Williamson study relies on these government

officials' ability to study contracts filed with the government under the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (prior to 1993 and 2004
amendments).
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third category of cases, challenges may arise because of conflicts between
agency actors.
1. The NIST Biomanufacturing Initiative
Since 2oo9, NIST has been working on a number of different fronts to
knowledge about biologics manufacturing.
develop fundamental
Fundamental research in biologics manufacturing clearly fits within NIST's
declared criteria for project priority setting: (1) "Magnitude/urgency of
industrial need;" (2) "Correspondence between need and NIST mission to
develop infrastructural technologies;" and (3) "Potential impact of NIST
involvement."' 6' The agency's overall title for the project-"Measurement
Science and Standards to Support the Development of Novel Protein
Therapeutics and Biosimilars"-reflects NIST's effort to appeal to both
originator manufacturers and biosimilar manufacturers.' 6 At least for
purposes of initial engagement, NIST has succeeded. Its cadre of declared
private and public sector partners includes all of the major biopharmaceutical
and biosimilar manufacturers as well as the FDA.' 63
2

2.

The NIST Cases

particularly
immunogenicity,
involves
basic
challenge
One
immunogenicity caused by aggregation.' 64 Measurement can vary by a factor
of ten, and measurement standards are needed.' 65 To create measurement
standards, 24 industry and academic participants have participated with NIST
in a comprehensive measurement study.' 66 A publication on this
measurement issue has been submitted to the Journalof PharmaceuticalScience,
and this information will soon be in the public domain.' 6 7

16l.

MICHAEL

J.

TARLOV,

MEASUREMENT

SCIENCE

AND

STANDARDS

TO SUPPORT

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF NOVEL PROTEIN THERAPEUTICS AND BIOSIMILARS (2014), https://www.ibbr.

umd.edu/sites/defauh/files/public-page/Tarlov%20-%2oBiomanufacturing%2oSummit.pdf.
162. Id.
163. According to the NIST website, industrial partners include "Abb~ie, Agilent, Amgen,
Biogen Idec, Boehringer-Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Coriolis Pharmaceuticals, Eli Lilly,
Genentech, GlaxoSmithKline, Human Genome Sciences-GSK, Janssen (Johnson & Johnson),
MedImmune, Novartis, Novavax, PepsiCo, Pfizer, Roche, Sandoz, Thermo Scientific, [and]
Waters." Biomanufacturing Initiative, NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist.gov/
mml/bmd/biomanufacturing.cfm (last visitedJan. 10, 2016). Regulatory and standards partners
include "the FDA, Health Canada, MPA-Sweden, NIBSC-UK, USP, [and] NIBRT-Ireland." Id.
Academic partners include the "University of Birmingham, the University of Delaware, the
Universities of Maryland (Baltimore and College Park) at the Institute for Bioscience and
Biotechnology Research (IBBR), [and the] University of New Hampshire." Id.
164. Interview with Michael Tarlov, Head of Biomanufacturing, Nat'l Inst. of Standards &
Tech. (July 1, 2014) (on file with authors); see also TARLOV, supra note 163.
165. TARLOV, supra note 163.
166. See id.
167. Interview with Michael Tarlov, supra note 166; see also The PotentialNeed for Meaurenent
Standards to Facilitatethe Research and Development of Biologic Drugs: HearingBefore the Subcomnm. or.
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Presumably originator and biosimilar firms do not perceive this area as
one of core competitive advantage, whether the competition is other
originator firms or biosimilar firms. To the contrary, at least if congressional
testimony by Amgen on this question is representative, originator firms view
immunogenicity as a very significant potential risk that they need to reduce
but cannot cheaply reduce on their own.168

A second project on which NIST is working involves a collaboration with
the FDA and Health Canada on a set of "best practices" for characterizing
end-product biologics using NMR fingerprinting. 69Although, as discussed in
Part II, current public domain analytical methods for characterization are
insufficient to show products are identical, these agencies are working to
improve public domain information about characterization through NMR.
This project's efforts do not involve any industry participants. Notably,
originator firms may not be interested in acquiring fundamental knowledge
in this area of characterization for fear that the FDA will adopt a rule forcing
the firms to use the technique post-approval but will balk if the results of the
technique show even minor changes.17o On the biosimilar side, a least one
biosimilar firm, Sandoz, has used NMR, including for purposes of
characterizing the biosimilar product it submitted for FDA approval in July
2014.'7' Sandoz may consider its knowledge a core competitive advantage.
In a third line of inquiry, NIST is spearheading the creation of a generalpurpose standard monoclonal antibody for checking the performance of a
variety of different analytical methods.172 Although the results of this project
will obviously assist in characterization, this indirect assistance is apparently
not perceived as threatening core competitive advantage. To the contrary, 65
biopharmaceutical firm and academic participants are participating and the

Tech. & Innovation of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 1 11th Cong. 74-8 1 (2009) (testimony of Dr.
Willie E. May, Director, Chemical Science and Technology Laboratory, National Institute of

Standards and Technology).
168. Id. at 1o-15 (statement of Anthony Mire-Sluis, Executive Director, Global Product
Quality, Amgen Inc.).
169. Interview with Michael Tarlov,supra note 166; see also TARLOV, supra note 163.
170.
See CTR. FOR BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION, SUMMARY: IMPLEMENTING INNOVATION IN
BIOMANUFACTURING-THE HURDLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2011) (on file with authors) (noting

that "despite... exciting advances in analytical capabilities it was unclear if pharmaceutical
companies would take the risks necessary to adopt new technologies. On the one hand, new
sensors will allow better process monitoring and control, enabling greater assurance that the
product is the same for each batch. However, there is also a fear that if a company uses new
methods to analyze its products it will see something it hasn't seen before. Such thinking has led
some companies to never perform a new analytical test on an approved product. The question of
whether to adopt new technologies was put most succinctly by a member of the regulatory science
panel, 'What pain is going to be relieved? Which do I want more, relief of my pain or my
money?"').
171.
Hussain, supra note 63.
172. Interview with Michael Tarlov, supra note 166; see also TARLOV, supra note 163.
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results will be featured in a forthcoming American Chemical Society book.173
The material itself will be available through NIST at a nominal price.
NIST believes that both original and biosimilar firms will use the standard
material in regulatory submissions.m74 Whether FDA should explicitly
encourage use of the NIST standard poses an interesting question.
Longstanding Executive Branch policy discourages government imposition of
standards on private sector innovation.'75 But that position has been updated
in the Obama Administration to emphasize:
In limited policy areas.., where a national priority has been
identified in statute, regulation, or Administration policy, active
engagement or a convening role by the Federal Government may be
needed to accelerate standards development and implementation to
help spur technological advances and broaden technology
adoption. In these instances, the Federal Government can help
catalyze advances, promote market-based innovation, and
6
encourage more competitive market outcomes.' 7
The Obama Administration's Strategy for American Innovation specifically
identifies national priorities with respect to health care technology and
promoting clean energy.177 To the extent that future administrations
continue to see a more efficient health care system as a national priority,
biologics manufacturing should be a prime area for achieving efficiencies.
Consequently, the FDA's regulatory position may therefore be in tension not
only with current Executive Branch policy but also future policy.
Part V turns to the general issue of the FDA's regulatory stance. Even if
the NIST projects are unequivocally successful and NIST is then able to
increase its current $lo-million-a-year initiative, challenges remain.7s
Specifically, without appropriate flexibility on the part of regulatory
authorities, fundamental understanding may prove useful for originator and

173.
174.

Interview with Michael Tarlov, supra note 166.
Id.

175.

See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB

CIRCULAR No. A-

1 9---FEDERAL REGISTER (FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND

USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND

IN CONFORMITY

ASSESSMENT ACTrITIES),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-a i19_ai 19fr.
176. Memorandum from Aneesh Chopra, U.S. Chief Tech. Officer, Office of Sci. & Tech.
Policy, et al., to the Heads ofExec. Dep'ts & Agencies 2 (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2o 12/M-i 2-o8.pdf.
177. See generally NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, A STRATEGY FOR
AMERICAN INNOVATION (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_for_
americaninnovation_october_2015.pdf.
178. By way of very rough comparison, SEMATECH, the prominent public-private
consortium for improving semiconductor manufacturing processes, scaled up from an annual
budget of $3 million in 1988 to $141 million in 1993 (figures not adjusted for inflation). See
Albert N. Link et al., Estimatingthe Benefits from Collaboration: The Case of SEMA TECH, i1 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 737, 738 (1996).
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biosimilar firms only up to the point of approval. In other words, if FDA
continues to view approval as a "binary" event,,79 then the fruits of
fundamental knowledge will be inadequately realized. In the next Part, we
discuss this issue in the context of our broader discussion of adaptive
regulation.
V.

ADAPTIVE REGULATION

In recent years, some scholars who study regulation have argued that, in
areas of rapidly evolving science and incomplete knowledge, regulation itself
,
must be dynamic and adaptive. Io
Updating agency action has obvious costs.
Even if the update, like the original agency action, is quite informal and thus
does not have to go through elaborate administrative procedures such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking, updates place significant informationgathering burdens on staff. Adaptive regulation may be particularly
burdensome for agencies like the FDA that are asked to regulate a vast swath
of the U.S. economy but are given only limited resources.'

81

Moreover,

changes in agency position may invite those who are hostile to the change to
come up with creative legal challenge strategies. Although salient cases of
inaction can sometimes be challenged,'18

action is on balance still easier to

challenge than inaction. From the standpoint of industry, adaptive regulation
also invokes the familiar trade-off between rules that may fit poorly but are
stable and clear relative to flexible but uncertain standards.
That said, the social welfare losses associated with basing regulation on

incomplete or outdated science are obvious. Moreover, in the area of drug
approval, failure to regulate adaptively has an additional, subtler effect. If

approval necessarily means that "drugs are generally perceived to be 'safe and
effective"' upon licensure,' 8 3 then the drug regulator is likely to require
enormous amounts of data to approve the drug. Absent adaptive regulation,
this problem is likely to become worse: Analysts increasingly recognize that
current clinical trials are generally too small and too short to evaluate effects

179. Cf H.-G. Eichler et al., Adaptive Licensing: Taking the Next Step in the Evolution of Drug
Approval, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 4 26, 427 (2012) (arguing "that
knowledge of drugs is not binary but continues to evolve over time").
18o. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Adminstrative Law for Adaptive
Management,67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014). Some scholars who embrace adaptive regulation situate
themselves in opposition with what they call "minimalist" approaches that stress cost-benefit analysis,
efficiency, and market signals. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 1oo GEO. L.J. 53, 64 (20 11) ("[T] he potential value of costbenefit analysis is limited by its focus, at least in practice, on static factors as opposed to the capacity
for learning and adaptation."). This Article does not engage in this debate.
181. See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Recent Developments, The State of Science at the Food and Drug
Administration,6o ADMIN. L. REV. 431,447-50 (2oo8) (discussing resource constraints at the FDA).
182. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (challenging
the EPA refusal to regulate greenhouse gases).
183. See Eichler et al., supranote 181,at 426.
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in the population as a whole.' 84 The ultimate result may be requirements for
ever-longer
trials-presumably
a
result
many stakeholders
in
biopharmaceutical development, ranging from firms to patients, would find
dissatisfying.
Perhaps because of stakeholder pressure, proposals for one form of
adaptive regulation-adaptive licensing wherein a drug could be approved
for a small population and then subsequently have its use expanded to a larger
population as more safety and efficacy data become available-have achieved
some traction.
The EMA appears to be further ahead in this regard than the FDA.' 85 In
the United States, one concern has been the FDA's limited power to regulate
physician decisions to prescribe drugs for unapproved populations or uses
(so-called "off-label use").,86 Although the FDA Amendments Act of 2007
gives the agency somewhat greater power to impose risk-based restrictions, its
authority to do so is cabined by federalism-infused concerns that states should
maintain control over the practice of medicine.' 87 That said, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology political scientist Ken Oye, one of the principal
proponents of adaptive regulation by the FDA, has worked with several lawyers
(including Peter Barton Hutt, a former general counsel of the FDA) to
identify a legal pathway for FDA expeditiously to approve a drug for a small
88
population, with approval subsequently expanded to a larger population.
Others have suggested alternative adaptive approaches to regulate off-label
use. 189

Regulatory lock-in with respect to medicines is not limited to evaluation
of clinical effectiveness. To the contrary, as discussed in Part II.C, for both
small molecules and biologics, the FDA views the drug identity to be largely
set at the time of approval; changes to the manufacturing process that impact
drug characteristics are challenging, time-consuming, and expensive to
justify, and other changes also face hurdles of time, expense, and uncertainty.
Firms reinforce this regulatory resistance by tending to view the
manufacturing process to be largely set at the time of approval.
This stasis is unjustified in the context of small molecules.,9o In the
biologics context, FDA aversion to significant change post-approval is
currently justified to the extent that fundamental knowledge is absent. But

184.

See supranote 92.

See, e.g., Hans-Georg Eichler et al., The Risks of Risk Aversion in DrugRegulation, 12 NATURE
REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 907 (2013).
186. See generally Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence andExtrapolation:Mechanismsfor Regulating
Off-Label Uses of Drugs andDevices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377 (2014).
187. See generally id.
188. K. Oye et al., Legal Foundations of Adaptive Licensing, 94 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 309, 310 (2013).
189. Abbott&Ayres, supra note 188, at 399-417.
igo. See Price, supra note 73, at 519-22.
185.
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certain aspects of the FDA's very conservative approach may itself limit the
development of fundamental knowledge. For example, as noted in Part IV.B,
originator firms may be reluctant to develop more precise NMR
fingerprinting tools out of fear that the FDA will mechanically demand very
strict adherence to the more precise definition of the final product. Put
another way, agency use of greater fundamental knowledge as a straitjacket
itself discourages industry development of such knowledge.
Programs such as the NIST effort may soon produce greater fundamental
knowledge.'9' At that point, FDA should no longer resist a more flexible
approach. Indeed, in contrast to the area of physician prescribing practices
post-approval, FDA unequivocally has the legal authority to allow postapproval manufacturing changes with significantly greater flexibility than the
current bureaucratic process.'9
FDA's recent guidance for biosimilar approval, discussed in Part II.D,
does provide some grounds for optimism. This guidance explicitly adopts a
stepwise approach wherein no single step is seen as a sine qua non. Although
this guidance obviously applies only to the pre-approval stage, the principles
it reflects could certainly be carried forward into the post-approval stage.
VI. CONCLUSION
Biologics increasingly dominate the front lines of medical innovation and
are increasingly vital to doctors and patients. Drug companies pursue them in
search of significant and ongoing profits. We have no problem with that
pursuit: These ex ante incentives drive innovation in the biopharmaceutical
industry. What is problematic, however, is the indeterminate restriction of
information flow-and the resulting monopoly pricing-based not on the
carefully crafted bargains of patent protection or regulatory restrictions, but
on the interplay between secret information and the resulting specificity of
FDA regulatory oversight. This interaction undermines the policy choice,
made explicit in the BPCIA, that biologics, like small-molecule drugs, should
have a limited period of exclusivity and then be opened up to competition.
As a result, our healthcare system pays ever-increasing prices for biologics, and
biosimilars seem unlikely to make much of a dent in those prices. Perhaps
more insidiously, this pattern of indeterminate exclusivity relies on and
perpetuates a lack of fundamental knowledge of the development and
production of biologics. Firms face weak or nonexistent incentives to learn
more about how biologics can be developed and produced, and may in fact
face incentives to avoid developing such knowledge.
These challenges are not straightforward on either a scientific or a policy
level, and point to the need for a more active innovation policy in the field of

SeesupraPartIV.
See 21 C.F.R. § 6o1.12 (2015) (discussing requirements for changes, including
manufacturing changes, to an approved application).
191.
192.
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biologics and biologics manufacturing. Government-sponsored initiatives
such as those spearheaded by NIST are a step forward, but should be
complemented by action to encourage and enable greater innovation by the
private sector. In particular, the FDA can play a pivotal role, both by
regulating adaptively to allow greater manufacturing innovation and by
incentivizing disclosure of the codified information it already receives from
biologics firms. With coordinated policy attention, the biologics sector can be
driven toward greater innovation, greater transparency, and greater
competition-an outcome that promises benefits for industry, healthcare cost
containment, and, ultimately, patients.
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